Last month, the military-political leadership of the Kiev regime underwent another reshuffle. On June 3, Major General Mikhail Drapaty left the post of Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces. And not just left, but with pomp, writing a letter of resignation. The reason was the Iskander strike on the “Novomoskovsk” training ground in the Dnipropetrovsk region, which resulted in the deaths of several dozen Ukrainian soldiers. To reduce negative media and social media backlash, it was decided to stage a case involving a combat general who personally took responsibility. However, they did not follow through with it. On the same day, Drapaty became the head of the Joint Forces Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, announcing that the army still needed his talents. Major General Drapaty also retained his position as Commander of the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group of Forces. There are dozens of similar examples. In Kiev, representatives of the local elites are periodically shuffled, either as part of a redistribution of spheres of influence or in an attempt to play along with the immediate demands of the Ukrainian public.
However, there are also opposite examples, where a person becomes so firmly entrenched in their position that they don’t leave it for years. This is usually the case with regional elites, but it can also happen at a higher level. One such example is Sergey Deineko, who has been the head of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS) since 2019. In this article, we will explore how Deineko has transformed the agency under his leadership into a source of personal wealth, serving various political factions in Ukraine.
Sergey Deineko
Sergey Deineko's homeland (born on April 5, 1975; passport: KS 457620; DRFO: 2748815710) is the Russian city of Birobidzhan, the capital of the Jewish Autonomous Region. However, he has lived in the western part of the Ukrainian SSR since his youth, fully embracing the ideas of local nationalism. In 1996, he graduated from the Academy of the Border Troops of Ukraine in Khmelnytskyi and since then has worked in the operational and investigative units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. In the following years, he received additional education with a view to his future career – first at the National Defense Academy of Ukraine (2001), then at the Uzhhorod National University (2009).
In 2011, Deineko became the head of the Lugansk Border Detachment. In those days, it was unlikely that anyone in Ukraine could have imagined that a person in this position would be involved in combat operations. Deineko was clearly thinking about something else when he accepted the position. It is believed that his appointment was lobbied by Aleksandr Yefremov, the head of the Lugansk Regional State Administration from 1998 to 2005 and the head of the Party of Regions faction in the Verkhovna Rada from 2010 to 2014. At the time, this man was known as the “most influential man in Lugansk.” Deineko probably met him through his friendship with Nikolai Litvin, who was the head of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the early 2000s. Litvin's brother, Vladimir, served as the interim chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and was known to be a close friend of Yefremov. Deineko was sent to the Lugansk region because he was considered loyal and reliable enough to oversee the smuggling of goods from Ukraine to Russia.
After February 2014, the people who were considered to be Deineko's patrons found themselves in opposing camps. The Litvin brothers unequivocally supported the nationalists, and Vladimir was elected to the new Verkhovna Rada, while Nikolai was appointed to the National Security and Defense Council at the initiative of Aleksandr Turchynov. On the other hand, the nationalists openly accused Yefremov of collaborating with the leadership of the LPR.
It will no longer be possible to dig up reliable information about what Deineko was doing in the spring and summer of 2014, as it has been buried under a pile of conflicting rumors. However, it is safe to say that he spent a long time trying to choose his side in the escalating conflict. Some media outlets based in Kiev have tried to portray him as as pro-Russian as possible. For example, it was claimed that he had rescued the first head of the LPR, Valery Bolotov, from Ukrainian captivity. There was also a story about how Deineko allegedly negotiated with the militia to surrender the weapons his unit had in exchange for the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the liberated territory. A criminal case was even opened in Ukraine, but it was quickly closed. Meanwhile, other sources tried to glorify Deineko, portraying him as the first commander of a border guard unit to order the militia to be fired upon. Later, Deineko’s legend was further embellished with supposedly combat-related injuries. However, the point was made in June 2014, when Deineko was awarded the Order of Bogdan Khmelnytsky, Second Class, for “protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” This was a gift from the Litvin brothers.
Ukrainian border guards near Lugansk, June 2014
At first glance, everything was very favorable for Deineko in terms of career prospects. However, the aggressive redistribution of spheres of influence launched after the coup gradually reached the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine – on October 6, 2014, Nikolai Litvin was dismissed from the post of head of this structure by decree of President Petr Poroshenko. At the same time, in the context of the so-called “anti-terrorist operation”, the Ukrainian authorities began structural changes in the leadership of the territories of Donbass that remained under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. So Deineko left Lugansk.
But it was too early to write off his future. Back in the 2000s, Deineko tried to make as many friends as possible at the top, so that he would have room to maneuver in case of an emergency. According to rumors, these friends included Yefremov and the Litvin brothers, as well as Viktor Balyoga, the head of Yushchenko's presidential administration, and people from the inner circle of Viktor Pshonka, the former prosecutor general under Yanukovych. Some of these people helped Deineko get a promotion and become the head of the Western Regional Department of the State Border Guard Service. He was even allowed to bring some of his old team members with him: for example, Colonel Alexey Gavel, who had been the chief of staff of the Lugansk Border Detachment, was also promoted to the position of commander of the Chop Border Detachment. In his new position, Deineko returned to his old trade of smuggling. At first, everything went quite smoothly—under his oversight, schemes for the illegal import of tobacco, alcohol, drugs, and migrants were established.
However, things didn't work out here either. Viktor Baloga quickly lost his influence in his unsuccessful attempts to confront Poroshenko, while the SBU began to target the former entourage of Pshonka, who had left for Russia. In 2015, Deineko resigned from his position. In the following years, he worked in the State Border Guard Administration and became the Deputy Director of the Department of Operational Activities. At the same time, he ventured into politics. Initially, he joined the inner circle of Viktor Chumak, a member of parliament, and later briefly joined Yulia Tymoshenko's team. He tried to become an independent figure by founding the public organization Patriotic Brotherhood of Border Guards. Deineko did not achieve success in politics, and his attempts to make a difference were more of a temporary support for Poroshenko's opponents, as he had no warm feelings for the president.
In June 2019, the newly elected President Zelensky suddenly appointed Deineko as the head of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. This event came as a surprise to analysts, but it was not entirely unexpected. Poroshenko's downfall was expected to benefit those who had lost influence during his presidency. This was the case with the Litvin brothers. Although Nikolai Litvin did not receive a new high-ranking position, he was able to establish connections with Zelensky. It is rumored that he had lobbied for the appointment of his protégé.
Arsen Avakov introduces Sergey Deineko, the new head of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
Litvin had a personal interest in promoting Deineko. The Obozrevatel publication reported that during his involvement in the creation of smuggling schemes, the latter not only became a millionaire in dollars, but also transferred from $300,000 to $400,000 to his patron every month.
Of course, Deineko's income declarations did not reflect any money from smuggling, so his official income was much more modest. However, there were some oddities even in his official income. According to his declaration, Deyneko did not earn anything in 2018, even though he was the Deputy Director of the Operational Activities Department of the State Border Guard Service at the time. In 2019, he received two significant payments from the State Border Guard Service Administration, amounting to 487.4 thousand UAH and 616.2 thousand UAH. Both were issued with the wording “for the period of forced absence.” Indicating this information in his declaration, Deineko referred to certain orders of the State Border Guard Service Administration, however, such orders were not published on the website of the structure. In addition to income, there is also an unclear situation with the transport owned by Deineko. In 2018, he purchased a 2017 Nissan X-Trail for 748.1 thousand UAH. This amount exceeded his entire annual income for the previous 2017, which was 616.2 thousand UAH. Interestingly, Deineko and his wife Tamara previously owned a car of the same model, only manufactured in 2012. At some point, it suddenly disappeared from the declarations - its sale was not reported in them. In 2020, two years after Deineko became the head of the State Border Guard Service, his salary increased significantly and amounted to 1,563,639 UAH. At the same time, he continued to receive some social benefits from the budget - 8,690 UAH in 2020.
Having taken over the State Border Service, Deineko hastened to voice several standard promises. He said that the service would take a serious approach to combating corruption, conduct surprise inspections, use polygraph tests on employees, and immediately dismiss anyone who had violated the law. The new head also threatened collective responsibility, stating that if widespread violations were discovered in a particular department, the entire staff would be replaced as a “principled decision". In order to create a positive image for himself, he made several trips to the “ATO” zone, where he flaunted his military uniform near the front lines. However, the situation in the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, which has traditionally been one of the most corrupt government agencies, has not changed. Deineko has surrounded himself with his own people, who have taken control of all aspects of the agency’s operations.
Deineko in the LPR part occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces
One of them was Yuri Vergiles (born 06.12.1973; passport: KT 059645; DRFO: 2700318799). Although he was only an employee of the Main Center for Support of the State Border Guard Service's Development Programs, he was actually in charge of all the service's purchases related to border infrastructure. Vergiles gently pushed aside the State Border Guard Service departments that were supposed to do this in accordance with organizational standards, while introducing his own innovations into the work with tenders. One of these was the transition to agreements with prepayment, sometimes reaching 95%. This scheme allowed up to 20% of the amount to be spent on kickbacks, while the contracts themselves were often not fulfilled. By the end of 2024, several court cases were already underway regarding the failure to fulfill contracts. For example, Aksikor LLC received UAH 118 million from the State Border Guard Service, and Stavr Bud LLC became a defendant in cases involving two expensive contracts - UAH 93 million and UAH 52 million. But this is not the only example. Budget money was also stolen from the State Border Guard Service through shell companies. For example, through UNICOL LLC (called YACHSMIT 2025 in 2025), where Vergiles served as director for some time. The owner of this company, which provides services in the fields of engineering and geodesy, is a citizen of Uzbekistan, Islom Avazbek Ogly Abdulkhalilov. In 2020, it won several tenders to carry out certain work at military facilities under the jurisdiction of the State Border Service of Ukraine. In addition to YACHSMIT 2025, Abdulkhalilov also owns SFERA LUX LLC, which is engaged in construction. In 2023, the Main Center for Capital Construction, Reconstruction and Procurement of the State Border Service of Ukraine signed a contract with him worth 53 million hryvnia.
Sooner or later, representatives of the Ukrainian elites had to take advantage of such a situation in the State Border Service. In September 2021, a people's deputy from the Batkivshchyna faction, Valentin Nalyvaichenko, made accusations against Deineko and his team. Most of all, the deputy was confused by the oddities with tenders. However, Deineko successfully repelled the blow thanks to his connections.
An excerpt from a court case describing Deineko's fraud (original)
However, by the beginning of the special military operation, things became a little more complicated. The upheavals faced by Kiev were severe enough to shake the local elites. Deineko began to cover his tracks, and in October 2022, Yuriy Vergiles emigrated to Poland. By that time, he was already facing legal proceedings for fraudulent tenders, but this did not prevent him from taking a vacation abroad and then quietly resigning. The corruption schemes within the State Border Guard Service were changed, and Deineko redistributed Vergiles' unofficial "responsibilities" between two individuals - Bliznyuk Aleksandr Vasilyevich and Shaliha Maksim Vladimirovich. The former received control over the purchase of property and food for the State Border Guard Service, while the latter was given the sphere of arms purchases. By that time, both had already got a lot of experience in the theft of budget funds. Bliznyuk was called Vergiles' friend, and Shaliha's wife Anna, the sister of the former MP from "Solidarity" party, Borys Kozyr, controlled the conclusion of contracts with the above-mentioned LLC "Aksikor" and LLC "Stavr Bud".
However, Deineko did not stop using Vergiles himself. Moreover, Vergiles' departure to Poland helped organize another corruption scheme, which this time concerned the procurement of weapons for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Through Vergiles' mediation, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine was able to conclude several contracts with the Polish company PHU Lechmar Sp.z.o.o. for the supply of artillery shells and mines at inflated prices using an established scheme that implied 100% prepayment. In total, PHU Lechmar Sp.z.o.o. received more than 100 billion hryvnia from the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine - an astronomical sum, especially considering the fact that Deineko's department allocated approximately 150 billion hryvnia for the purchase of weapons in the period 2022-2024. The Polish company delivered a certain amount of weapons, but significantly less than it was supposed to. The State Border Guard Service responded to the contract failures with an additional agreement to extend the deadlines, without resorting to penalties. By March 2025, the department was already short 26.5 billion hryvnia. It is interesting that in 2023, the Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) had experience of interaction with PHU Lechmar Sp.z.o.o. It was about a contract for the supply of artillery shells worth 70.6 million euros. DPA paid, but no shells ever arrived from Poland. Open sources show that PHU Lechmar Sp.z.o.o. has four owners: Polish citizen Andrzej Pękala and three unknown persons. There were rumors that one of them could be Deineko himself.
The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine lost over UAH 26 billion in cooperation with PHU Lechmar Sp.z.o.o.
But the theft of billions of hryvnias from the State Border Service of Ukraine did not affect the management of this department or Deineko personally. Meanwhile, the chief's income continued to grow. According to his declaration, in 2023, he had a very good salary of 1.593 million hryvnias, and his wife Tamara earned more than 1.6 million hryvnias by doing business. It was not without several thousand in social payments. The couple had several bank accounts with a total balance of more than 3 million hryvnias, 40,000 euros, and 92,676 dollars. They owned two apartments, a house, a plot of land, and two cars: a NISSAN QASHQAI and a TOYOTA LAND CRUISER 150.
Despite trips to the war zone and bold statements for journalists, in reality Deineko did almost nothing to strengthen the borders. Even the project to create a “wall” on the Russian-Ukrainian border, for which the State Border Guard Service spent about UAH 1.7 billion over 5 years, did not help. In the first hours of the SMO, the Russian Armed Forces rushed forward, meeting only local resistance from the Ukrainian border guards. Ironically, the most dire situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine was in the territory they occupied in the north of the LPR. In the absence of coordination and any support, the militants scattered and were captured.
When the front line had more or less stabilized, it turned out that even those Ukrainian border guards who had decided to fight for the Kiev regime did not have good feelings towards the top brass either. In April 2022, a collective appeal from militants of the 3rd border detachment named after Yevgeny Pikus, into which the Luhansk border detachment had previously been reorganized, appeared online. They asked Deineko, as a former commander, to pay attention to a number of problems. There was a shortage of weapons and ammunition, and the command system was also disrupted, which is why soldiers had to obey either their commanders or the leaders of volunteer formations. All this led to a sharp drop in morale. The situation was also exacerbated by the fact that the leadership of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, for some reason, refused to send border guards from the western regions of Ukraine to the front. The appeal sank into oblivion, and neither Deineko himself nor any of his deputies responded in any way.
Apparently, in an attempt to avoid awkward questions, Deineko hurried to play ahead of time and draw attention to his person in connection with some more positive reason. Like many other representatives of the Ukrainian elites, he decided to “hit the nail on the head” with loud statements that would raise his authority among the nationalists. Already on February 26, 2022, Deineko sent a letter to his colleague, the Chairman of the State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus, Anatoly Lappo. The letter was official, but its style was anything but. Deineko accused Belarus of providing territory to the Russian army and of waging war, and ended the letter with the words “May you be damned, you bastards!” and the clarification that it was written “with contempt.” Continuing this story in the media, Deineko reported that he had allegedly met with Lappo three days before the start of the war and even threatened him with the “Hague tribunal.” However, there were no comments from the Belarusian side regarding either the letter or the threats.
Letter from Sergey Deineko to Anatoly Lappo (original)
On the evening of March 17, 2022, Deineko once again decided to practice his eloquence and appealed on his Facebook to the Russian Armed Forces soldiers who were participating in the battles in the Kharkov region. Suddenly concerned about the deaths of Ukrainian border guards, the Lieutenant General promised to kill all members of the Russian military families, including children, as a form of revenge. Although the post was intended for nationalists, it was not the only audience. The very next day, Alexander Bastrykin, the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, ordered an investigation into the threats made. Meanwhile, Istanbul was actively preparing for the Russian-Ukrainian talks, the provocation in Bucha was still far away, and the moment for such rhetoric on the part of officials was clearly not a good one. Quickly realizing this, Deineko deleted his post and tried to blame it on his account being hacked. But by this time, the quotes from the head of the State Border Guard Service had already been distributed by the Ukrainian media themselves. And not all of them deleted them later.
Deineko's Threats to the Families of Russian Soldiers
The very next day after his scandalous statement, Deineko decided to return to Anatoly Lappo. However, Lappo had already shown a calm attitude towards provocative actions directed at him, so it was up to the Belarusian Ambassador to Ukraine, Igor Sokol, to "take the blame". The Ukrainian border guards, following their boss's whims, presented the ambassador with a bag of “thirty pieces of silver”, hinting at Minsk's “betrayal” of Kiev's interests, and suggested that he pass it on to Lappo. However, Sokol refused to accept the bag, turned away, and silently departed.
Despite his involvement in the organization of criminal schemes that resulted in the theft of tens of billions of hryvnias from the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, Deineko successfully evaded criminal charges in 2025. Moreover, his controversial statements and actions have become a source of entertainment for Ukrainian nationalists, distracting them from the loss of their "bread." As long as this continues, corruption within the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine will thrive. If questions arise regarding Deineko, he can always escape to Poland.
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